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Abstract 
 
 
The present paper analyses the securitisation of time by national sovereignties and the 
challenges posed to this nationalised time by ethnic minorities in two countries, i.e. Romania and 
Turkey. The argument builds on an understanding of sovereignty as inseparable from the modern 
subjectivity discoursing it and the spatial and temporal coordinates of this subjectivity. It employs 
the Heideggerian theorisation of the modern sovereign subjectivity to explain, with an appeal to 
Derrida, how this subjectivity produces its private temporality in terms of its own present-
presence. In the same, Heideggerian tradition of thought, the paper then theorises national 
sovereignty as an onomastic exercise placing the private temporality of the sovereign subjectivity, 
its conception of past and future, under the name of the nation. The author elaborates on Giorgio 
Agamben’s view of sovereignty as state of exception and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s theory of 
naming in order to explicate how the national, sovereign subjectivity authors in this way its own 
realm, its own normality and the exceptions from that normality. This amounts to the production 
of the consensus of national sovereignty expressed in the policies of the modern state. The result, 
in the account by Jacques Rancière and Erin Manning, excludes politics contesting the sovereign 
consensus, which in an onomastically nationalised political life excludes, in fact, the non-national 
inside, i.e. the ethnic minorities and their alternative predication of political life. The author illustrates 
how the production of the nationalised temporality has emerged in Romania and Turkey and also 
how the most numerous minorities there, Hungarian and Kurdish respectively, have started 
challenging the consensus of national sovereignty. Since Romania has already become EU 
Member State and Turkey is currently a candidate to EU membership, the research also sheds a 
new light on the possibility of post-national politics in Europe under the aegis of the Union. 
Keywords: international relations, securitization, temporality, national sovereignities, 
ethnicity, political life. 
 
  
Academic intelligence has been historically involved in the making and 
re-making of our cultural, social, economic, and political life. The academia, i.e. 
the producer of such intelligence, operates by tradition with already existing 
theories that provide analytical reference and guidance. The object of analysis 
approached in this text, however, demands more than that. The chapter 
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illustrates an instance when the ad hoc elaboration of a theory is crucial for the 
production of politics-related intelligence. 
That is because under scrutiny here are the implications of a novel 
political discourse of a certain ethnic minority, which challenges the 
mainstream theory and practice of state sovereignty. Consequently, the issue 
could be, or become extremely important in domestic and international politics. 
More specifically, the analysis focuses on the demand of Hungarians in 
Romania that sovereignty be shared between the ethnic majority and minorities 
in the respective state (Csergo 2007: 37-38).1 This calls implicitly for a re-
constitution of sovereignty as to allow for equality of status between all ethnic 
communities without altering the territorial configuration of Romania and 
regardless of numeric, that is, quantitative difference. 
The issue of equality of status clearly invites then a non-quantitative, i.e. a 
qualitative understanding of inter-ethnic relations. This practically renders 
obsolescent the mainstream theory of national sovereignty and of minority 
rights in relation with the territorially-defined national sovereignty. These notions 
have been derived from the principle of self-determination, ambiguously 
formulated by Woodrow Wilson in 1919 (MacMillan 2001: 11-12). According 
to it, the new sovereign nations in Central and Eastern Europe enjoyed full 
sovereign rights, while the situation of ethnic minorities was regulated through 
population exchanges and/or international minority rights guarantees 
(Jackson Preece 2005: 165-166).  
In that context, the principle of sovereignty was understood in the old 
Wesphalian tradition as one nation’s absolute internal authority, inviolable from 
within and without, to rule on a territorially bound state (Bartelson 1995: 31, 41; 
James 1999: 462; Teschke 2003: 116). But the formula also encoded in fact the 
dominant position of ethnic majorities in and their interests over particular 
spaces (Atanasova 2004: 357; Teschke 2003: 245). As a result, in the 
contemporary nation-states, ethnic majority-minority relations have been 
inherently relations of power, hence inequality (Barzilai 2005). 
Indeed, inter-ethnic inequality is ontologically inherent to the historical 
constitution of national states on the principle of popular (read “national”) 
sovereignty. The nation-states have excluded ethnic minorities in one way or 
another in order to exist at all. Under such conditions, the minority, non-
dominant ethnic communities have become mere objects of “minority policies” 
of national states, which have also shaped “inter-national” politics, including the 
minority rights regime in international law (Kymlicka 2007: 381-382; Jackson 
Preece 2005: 147; Sasse 2005: 674). 
                                                          
1
  Similar claims were raised by the Albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) in the early 1990s and, more recently, by Kurds in Turkey. Due to lack of 
editorial space, the author has opted to focus here only on the case of the Hungarians in Romania. 
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In a political world so much bound to the ontology of sovereign national 
states, the above-mentioned demand of the Hungarian minority for equality of 
status and the sharing of sovereign authority in Romania may then make little 
sense. However, and this is the main hypothesis tested here, the sense of such 
demands can be grasped if the analysis moves beyond the quantitative 
understanding of national sovereignty. Political representatives of Hungarians in 
Romania have explicitly called for the re-making of the respective polity to 
allow for the equality of status between the ethnic majority and minorities as 
nations constitutive of the state (Csergo 2007: 37-38). The target of the 
Hungarian minority militancy may thus be not the principle of sovereignty, but 
its national content. 
The author needs then to build here an analytical mechanism on the 
assumption, explained and tested below, that such views are better understood if 
national sovereignty is theorised as securitising both its physical and 
non-physical domains. The notion of securitisation is borrowed from the 
Copenhagen School in international relations where it has emerged in direct 
connection with social constructivism. Put simple, the prioritisation of 
something over any other thing in authoritative discourse means that the 
respective thing is given exceptional attention requiring exceptional security 
measures, i.e. is securitised (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-25). Securitisation is 
therefore first and foremost a speech-act and the utterance of security in 
connection with a thing is thus understood to securitise that particular thing 
(Wæver 1995: 55). 
There is nevertheless much more to the concept than may seem on the 
face of it. That is because the discourse of securitisation suspends in fact the 
‘normal’ ways of politics, by ‘the staging of existential issues in politics to lift 
them above politics’ (Wæver 1995: 46-86; see also Buzan et al. 1998: 23-24). 
The uttering of security is thus capable of moving whatever it refers to beyond 
the inter-subjective realm of politics (Guzzini 2005: 513) into the realm of 
sovereign consensus over what is a threat.  
In my interpretation, the sovereign consensus, which is a theoretical 
construct, authors its own realm of tangible (f)actuality. And it is with this very 
authoring of its own (f)actuality that entities within the realm of sovereignty are 
securitised in accordance with the sovereign discourse of its own secure (read 
“consensual”) political normality. Ethnic minorities are entities that become 
securitised in the discourse of national sovereignty as anomalies from the 
national political normality, hence turned into mere objects of specific policies 
of securitisation, i.e. minority policies. The realm of politics is essentially a 
space of equality of status between antagonistic discourses, while policies are 
spaces of authority where the equality of status between actors involved is 
excluded. Thus, the policy subject (the national sovereign) and the policy object 
(the ethnic minority) are obviously in a relation of power and inequality.  
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This interpretation allows for theorising majority-minority relations of 
power and inequality in a more explicit way. Thus, in the modern political 
context of democracy under national sovereignty (Freeman 2002: 115-116; 
Jackson Preece 2005: 12-13; Mill 1972: 392-393), minorities have been 
historically exiled at the periphery of political possibilities in positions of 
inferiority (Bleiker and Chou 2010: 12). In such positions, minorities became 
subject to state policies aiming to exclude or/and assimilate them (Jackson 
Preece 2005: 156, 184-186). Indeed, in the very logic of liberal democracy, 
ethnic diversity has been interpreted as a threat potentially undermining the 
nation-state’s cohesiveness and stability, thus representing a security problem 
(Jackson Preece 2005: 4-5; Sasse 2005: 674-675). Subjecting ethnic minorities 
to specific policies of the sovereign state implied their being suspended from the 
“normal” politics between equal participating actors. 
The Hungarians’ demand for inter-ethnic equality of status in Romania 
already makes more sense then. However, fundamental principles of state 
sovereignty firmly embedded in domestic and international politics would pose 
resistance. That is primarily due to our political imagination being blocked in 
the mainstream conception of sovereignty that sees it exclusively in relation 
with its constituted, physical and hence only quantitatively explicable domains: 
territory, physical bodies, and so on. Obliged by the main hypothesis advanced 
above, I propose to test a theorisation of sovereignty as phenomenon occurring 
both in space and in time, elaborated upon in the next section. This will 
facilitate a better understanding of (1) the possibility of and (2) the ways to 
facilitate a politics of inter-ethnic equality under state sovereignty, which would 
in turn contribute to state stability. The path adopted here toward such a 
theorisation is the phenomenological one, which the next section clarifies. 
 
 
The Consensus of Sovereignty and the Nationalisation of Time: 
Methodological Considerations 
 
The prioritisation of territoriality in theorising sovereignty means that 
quantitative aspects of its application are highlighted, but the quantitative ones 
remain obscured. However, sovereignty cannot be understood in isolation from 
the subjectivity discoursing it and from the spatial and temporal dimensions of 
that subjectivity. Heidegger (1962: 458; see also Odysseos 2007: xxiv, 97, 138) 
described the modern self as sovereign, sufficient, indivisible and apt to master 
nature. This modern subject has instituted its sovereign authority over its own 
possibilities of life (Odysseos 2010: 21) with a claim to unity effacing 
multiplicity (Bleiker and Chou 2010: 12-13; Odysseos 2007: 7). It therefore 
resembles the state’s indivisibility in deciding sovereignly over its political 
condition. Indeed, the concept describes eventually any autonomous and self-
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sufficient subject having ultimate authority of decision over its possibilities of 
being (Bartelson 1995: 2, 24).  
Agamben theorised sovereignty in this sense as authoring of the political 
system. The very language of the sovereign law of constitution indicates a 
demiurgic act of a subjectivity endowed with constitutive authority (auctoritas) 
that creates, legitimates and guarantees the whole political life (Agamben 2005: 
82; Borislavov 2005). This legal discourse constitutes and perpetuates the state 
form and, with it, a particular form of political life whose territoriality serves à 
posteriori for the spatial positioning (Aron 1966: 182; Bartelson 1995: 31) of 
the constitutive act. It is the language of constitutional discourse producing a 
particular state, therefore, rather than physicalities such as territory that 
ontologises in physical factuality, i.e. (f)actualises the constitutive power and its 
domains. And that presupposes the discursive engineering by the constitutive 
subjectivity of its own presence in the temporality of human life. 
Indeed, in the phenomenological understanding of things, ‘Being that can 
be understood is language’ (Gadamer 1998: 474; see also Heidegger, 1962: 203-204). 
And sovereignty is ontologically bound to speech through the subjectivity 
speaking sovereignly. Language is in fact ‘the sovereign who [...] declares that 
there is nothing outside [itself]’ (Agamben 1998: 21). But a subjectivity also 
authors through speech its own (f)actual presence, i.e. it makes itself present by 
authoring its own temporal present, its own ‘now’ (Heidegger 1962: 458). 
Individual or collective, a sovereign subjectivity institutes its unitary wholeness 
as (f)act of life in a temporal dimension, its nowness.  
Derrida elaborated on the Heideggerian notion of presence with ontological 
foundation in nowness (Heidegger 1962: 47-48; Derrida 1981: 5-6; 2003: 19) and 
theorised it as both (f)actual and temporal category, i.e. present-presence. This 
in turn signals a speaking subjectivity instituting its particular, full and private 
temporality (Ungureanu 2008: 304-305) discoursed from the now-situation of the 
sovereign speaker (Derrida 1982: 34). The discourse of sovereignty – otherwise 
a purely theoretical construct (Krasner 1999; Wendt 1992: 412-415) – engineers 
in this way its own particular political form with a particular temporal presence 
defined by sovereign consensus (Rancière 1999).  
Such consensus ontologically excludes alternative, multicultural forms in 
order to be at all (Bleiker and Chou 2010: 12-13; Odysseos 2007: 7; Rancière 1999: 78). 
In national form, the sovereign consensus authors political possibilities by 
nationalising political time (Manning 2004: 62-63). It thus narrows options even 
more by reducing the always multicultural human life to the particular political 
newness that is nationalised under the name of the nation. This illustrates a 
‘most radical individuation’ through language (Heidegger 1962: 62) made 
possible in political modernity. It condemns minorities to political life 
dominated by the dominant present-presence of the titular ethnicity, which 
sovereignly constitutes the state as space and time of inter-ethnic inequality.  
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The modern “national” state acting as physical embodiment of national 
sovereignty means the institution of the nation’s presence as condition of 
political possibilities. The imagined community turns in this way into a (f)act of 
life where it conditions not only a ‘politics of presence’ (Phillips 1995), but 
political ontology itself. In law, it institutes what is here called the objective 
presence of the nation, whose historical presence is also engineered in the 
discourse of national history.  
Indeed, with the encoding of such particularity in the language of 
constitutional law, the imagined national community (Anderson 2006) becomes 
an objective presence (f)actualised with the juridical category of citizenship and 
speaking the state’s official language. As part of this objective presence, the 
citizen is not anymore a mere member of a political community apt to develop 
rich possibilities of multicultural life. It is a citizen whose political relevance is 
conditioned by conformity with the ethnicised identity and the official language 
of the nationalised sovereignty. Political life itself is thus ethnicised through 
subordination to the name and language of the dominant ethnic group defining 
the political in its own national terms from the seat of sovereign auctoritas, its 
language being principle of order (Anderson 2006: 68). 
Central in the process remains however the act of naming, i.e. the 
onomastic act. Indeed, if language is intimate to the ontologisation of sovereignty, 
then everything defined as political by the sovereign consensus becomes so with 
‘being named’ in the language of sovereignty (Agamben 1998: 21). The 
nation’s name is the very name of the sovereign who institutes the consensus 
over what is and what is not political (Rancière 1999: 29) by declaring what is 
and what is not national. Two purely theoretical constructs, nation and 
sovereignty, are hence (f)actualised in one, monocultural objective presence 
through constitutional law. This declares the nation’s name and its language to 
be the nation-state’s principles of ontologisation in the always multicultural 
(f)actuality of human life. The analytical point of focus in the analysis below is 
therefore not the ideology of Romanian nationalism, but the nationalist 
discourse constitutive of the Romanian state at different stages in its historical 
becoming from the nineteenth century until nowadays. 
The state-constitutive Romanian nationalism will therefore be interpreted 
as discourse of sovereignty subordinating all political-cultural possibilities to the 
nominal nation’s ethno-citizenship and language. In ontologising its sovereign 
ethno-self, this national sovereignty discourse has exiled non-Romanian 
identities at the periphery of nationalised politics (Bleiker and Chou 2010: 12; 
Panayi 2000: 215). The next sections will explicate the self-institution of the 
Romanian sovereign subjectivity discoursing national sovereignty. The analysis 
will trace the production of the nation’s objective presence in legislation on 
citizenship and the official language along all important periods in the history of 
Romanian sovereignty, from 1859 until nowadays. This will be accompanied by 
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a scrutiny of the most often employed themes in the official versions of 
“national” history, which subordinate all temporality to the timeline of the 
nation’s becoming. Such themes will be identified particularly in the curricula 
of history teaching. This field of education has been identified as central, ever 
since the nineteenth century, in the national pedagogies engineering 
homogenous national identities (Smith 2000: 10; Weber 1976: 95, 333-334).  
The Hungarian political discourse demanding inter-ethnic equality of status 
will therefore be interpreted as breaking the Westphalian logic behind the superior 
status of titular, sovereign Romanian majority. At stake is therefore more than 
the issue of respect for all cultural identities by an already constituted sovereignty. 
It is a demand that sovereignty itself is reconstituted anew with a denationalised 
content allowing for the political ontologisation of the non-national, so that a 
time of politics of multiculturalism can emerge (Manning 2004: 62-64). 
 
 
The Romantic Age of the Romanian Sovereign Self 
 
Engineering the Romanian national sovereignty meant the production by 
local elites of a national tradition of homogenous unity (Smith 1999: 150). 
However, this also presupposed ascribing to the imagined national community a 
temporal continuity along past, present, and future (Giddens 1990: 37). 
Interpreted from the methodological perspective explained in the previous 
section, it all amounted to the securitisation of political time by colonising it 
with the imagined historical and objective presence of the Romanian ethnicity. 
Under these conditions, ethnic minorities have been gradually exiled at the 
periphery of political possibilities, subjected to the minority policies designed 
by the national sovereignty. 
The discourse of a Romanian sovereign self debuted sometime in the 
eighteenth century in a context when Romanian-speaking people were under 
domination from three different sovereign powers: the Habsburgs in 
Transylvania, the Ottomans in Walachia and western Moldova, and the Tsarist 
Empire in eastern Moldova.2 The idea of political independence was therefore 
logically accompanied by a nascent project of gradually eliminating the usually 
more prosperous foreigners and replacing them with a class of Romanians 
whose political identity an independent Romanian state had the duty to produce 
(Livezeanu 1995: 19; Lovinescu 1972: 305). The engineering of this collective 
political subjectivity built on the Romanian nationalism in Transylvania, born in 
                                                          
2
  The part of Moldova situated west of the Prut River will unite with the Principality of 
Walachia in 1859 to form the first independent Romanian state and continues to be part of 
modern Romania. The region of Moldova east of the Prut River was under Russian control and 
passed briefly under Romanian sovereignty between the two World Wars. It was re-annexed by 
the Soviet Union in 1944 and became the independent Republic of Moldova in 1991. 
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relation of enmity with the Hungarian other, and which later influenced the 
conception of national identity in Walachia and Moldova (Bădărău 1987: 132). 
The intellectual efforts of the Romanian elites were inspired by French, 
Italian and German experiences in nation building and focused on the search for 
the nation’s illustrious, ancient roots. This meant reference to the period of 
Roman rule in Dacia following Trajan’s victory against Dacian king Decebal. 
The subsequent annexation of this province to the empire inaugurated more than 
five generations (106-275 AD) of direct Dacian-Roman ethno-linguistic synthesis 
under Roman law (Boia 2001: Chapter 3; Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003: 420; 
McMahon 2009; Quinney 2007; Romocea 2004: 162). In the interpretation by 
early nationalist historians, the modern Romanian people were direct 
descendants of the ancient Romans, evidenced by their Romance language. 
This early nationalist literature has generally tended then to place that 
ancient history of Dacia in antithesis with the Romanians’ condition of 
servitude in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The brief unification of all 
principalities inhabited by Romanians under Michael the Brave in 1599 served 
in this context to indicate the historical inclination of this people toward 
political union, which legitimised contemporary projects of reunification 
(Boia 2001: 46-50; Livezeanu 1995: 130; Mitu 2001: 109-117). Dacia became 
inevitably the Romanian ‘ethnoscape’ (Smith 1999: 150) in nationalist literature 
building on the continuity of Latin cultural identity in this mythical space, with 
language as organic bond of Romanianhood. The theme was to play a central 
role, indeed, in the propaganda preparing the way to the unification of Walachia 
with Moldova in 1859, and with Transylvania in 1918 (Boia 2001: 113-114; 
Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003: 427, 432; Mitu 2001: 24; Quinney 2007: 446). 
Indeed, the location of most Dacian-Roman sites in Transylvania made 
this region quintessential for the predication of a Romanian continuous 
historical presence and thus legitimately entitled to sovereign self-
determination. We shall see in what follows that the gradual securitisation 
through nationalisation of political temporality in preparation of and especially 
under Romanian sovereignty de-legitimised alternative, minority conceptions of 
political time. This in turn strengthened the claim of the majority to objective 
presence, (f)actualised after 1859 in the legal formulation of the nation’s 
political identity in terms of citizenship and official language. Central in the 
process has been the ethnicisation of the very “Romanian” name of the people 
(archaic rumân, or modern român), which originally had a profound social 
connotation as it denominated the majority peasant serfs in Walachia and 
Moldova at least since the sixteenth century (Giurescu 2008: 31, 57-58). The 
word Romania itself had been in use until early modern times to indicate not the 
territory of the modern state, but the Latin Empire of Constantinople from the 
thirteenth century (Wolff 1948). 
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The ethnicisation of this name begun in connection with the intense 
efforts of local linguists, especially in the nineteenth century, toward enriching 
the Romance character of the national tongue with neologisms from French and 
Italian (Ahonen 2007: 23; Quinney 2007: 446). The Romanian language was to 
represent a crucial element in the (f)actualisation of the imagined community. 
Nationalist literati interpreted it as indicating the nation’s historical continuity 
and, in effect, its present-presence (Derrida 1982: 34; 1997: 66-67; Ungureanu 
2008: 304-305) in the region long before the arrival of other ethnic communities, 
such as the Hungarians, Slavs, or Ottoman Turks whose domination was 
therefore illegitimate and hence temporary. 
The emerging national historiography was thus stridently insisting on the 
Romanians’ continuity and ‘temporal priority’ over ethnic others (Verdery 1991: 175). 
In popular literature propagating this construct, the Slavic, Turkic and Ugric 
(Hungarian) people were invariably placed sometime after the Romanians. 
Topographic details already bearing Romanian names, contemporary minorities 
had therefore only the right to be guests in lands already colonised by national 
onomastics. The language of national toponomastics thus acted in this context 
as the imagined community’s principle of order (Anderson 2006: 68) 
(f)actualising a particular, nationalised political ontology.  
Consequently, the centuries-long domination of the Angevin Hungary and 
the Habsburgs in Transylvania, or that of the Ottoman and Russian Empires in 
Moldova and Wallachia have been interpreted in the modern discourse of 
Romanian political identity as mere periods of interruption in the historical line of 
Romanian continuity of Latin stock (Boia 2001: 113-114; Câmpeanu 1991: 820; 
Hitchins 1964: 670). The survival of the Romance language in the region was 
erroneously considered sufficient evidence attesting this continuity (Chen 2003: 
note 65; Quinney 2007: 445-447). However, linguistic identity also served in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as instrument in the construction of a political 
identity inclined toward Western values, that Romanians were historically 
destined to guard from Oriental alterity (Lovinescu 1972: 67; Mitu 2001: 30-33; 
197-198; Spiridon 2006: 377; Tănăsoiu 2005: 120). The result gradually taking 
shape in that period was the production of a national sovereign subjectivity 
building its own existence on the discursive elimination of “Oriental” ethnic 
others from a “self-Westernising” national ethno-space. 
The name of the nation became gradually central in the process. After its 
brief use in the thirteenth century to denominate the Latin Empire of Constantinople 
(Wolff 1948: 9, 13), the term ‘Romania’ reappeared in the nineteenth century in 
some minor, foreign works on the region’s geography (Boia 2001: 34). The terms 
rumân and rumânie, already in use for centuries in Walachia and Moldova 
referring to the rural serfs and their condition (Brezeanu 1999: 229-232; 
Giurescu 2008: 57-58; 119-146), became powerful ethno-political onomastics.  
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Ethnically non-Romanian “others” were always impersonated in such 
discourse by different people depending on the region where this Romanian 
nationalism became manifest. Thus, while the Hungarians were assigned the 
role in Transylvania, in Moldova and Walachia “the other” was Slavic and/or 
Ottoman and/or Jewish. Nevertheless, abundant reference in popular literature 
placed them all in the larger, indefinite category of non-Latin, Oriental alterity, 
which allowed Romanians to portray themselves as Latin, hence belonging 
naturally to the Western European family of values (Atanasova 2004: 367; 
Mitu 2001: 128-132; Quinney 2007). This discourse was embraced by the 1848 
generation, which was to become decisive in the emergence of the first 
Romanian sovereignty through the union of Walachia and Moldova in 1859.  
The 1848 revolutionary movement was led ideologically by a generation of 
intellectuals including Mihail Kogălniceanu, Constantin A. Rosetti, Ion C. Brătianu, 
August T. Laurian and Nicolae Bălcescu. These men were active as literary 
authors, publicists, historians, politicians and pioneers of the national education 
system. Kogălniceanu from Moldova and Bălcescu from Walachia, together 
with representatives of the late Transylvanian Enlightenment, were especially 
effective in promoting at the centre of the education philosophy the idea of 
national emancipation with profound xenophobic connotations (Boia 2001: 50; 
Iordache 1997: 5; Spiridon 2009: 153). As indicated above, the logic 
underlining this idea was that once subjection to Oriental foreigners ended, the 
nation would continue its normal historical flux as European people. The 
congruence between normality and Latin continuity constituted the cornerstone 
of this construct (Boia 2001: 50). 
Popular literature of the early and mid-nineteenth century was thus 
propagating a conception of the imagined national community whose 
members were necessarily born in Romanian lands and defined themselves 
ethno-linguistically as Romanians. Other ethnicities – Jews, Gypsies, Greeks, Tatars, 
Turks, Russians and Ukrainians still dwelling in Moldova and Walachia – were 
tacitly excluded from literary definitions of the Romanian nation, hence from 
the human domain potentially legitimating a future Romanian sovereignty 
(Boatcă 2006: 556; Iordachi 2001: 159; Mateescu 2008: 294-295; Rogobete 
2004: 287). The public of the time was already consuming a significant volume 
of literature insisting on the continuity of presence and unitary character of the 
Romanian nation. Scientific quality was not among priorities. The anthological 
exaggerations of the Transylvanian School of Enlightenment, in particular those 
authored by the Şincai-Maior-Klein triad, influenced nationalist historiography 
in Moldova and Walachia, too (Boia 2001: 131; Mitu 2001: 183). For instance, 
Gheorghe Şincai, writing in 1811 Transylvania, entrusted his readers that even 
the Bulgarian Tsardoms were in fact supported by the numerous Romanians 
from the southern bank of the Danube ten centuries after the evacuation of 
Moesia by the Romans (Boia 2001: 114-115). 
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Petru Maior, friend of Şincai and like him much influenced by German 
Romanticism (Gledhill 2005: 360), produced one year later an influential work 
aiming to totally Latinise the nation’s origins and claiming to this end that the 
Romans had exterminated all Dacians (Boia 2001: 86; Hitchins 2000: 25). 
Şincai and Maior, together with Samuel Klein, also inaugurated a trend in 
Romanian historiography insisting on the Latin purity of Romanian language. 
Since it was a tongue of such ‘primordial purity’ (Mitu 2001: 233), Romanian 
thus not only predated and differed from, but was also axiologically superior to 
Hungarian. Klein even created a system of transcription exaggerating etymological 
closeness between Romanian and Latin that he and Şincai employed in editing 
their Elementa Linguage Daco-Romanae in 1780 and influencing similar 
exaggerations in Moldova and Walachia (Hitchins 1964: 671-672). 
Such views also penetrated textbooks. Around three hundred village-schools 
in Romanian language appeared in Transylvania after a 1781 edict of the 
Habsburgs. Under Şincai’s personal guidance, these schools were to propagate 
Romanian nationalist propaganda despite certain countermeasures taken by the 
authorities (Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 296; Hitchins 1964: 664-666; Mârza 2010: 82). 
The works of popular poet Budai-Deleanu, ‘charged with ethno-cultural and 
political meanings’ under Herderian influences, were promoted in this context 
(ibid.: 88). The nationalist works by Petru Maior were also included in the curriculum. 
They built on the above-mentioned idea of the Romans exterminating the Dacians 
and not marrying ‘barbarian’ Dacian women. In Maior’s view, Romanians also 
kept this habit, unlike the migratory Hungarians who came ‘from the East’ 
without women and thus had to mix their blood with local Slavs and Greeks. In 
this racial logic, pupils were taught that Romanians were then superior to 
Hungarians due to their older and purer roots (Hitchins 1964: 662, 664). 
Such discursive strategies soon crossed the Carpathians with the Saint 
Sava Academy in Bucharest and the Mihăilean Academy in Iaşi adopting the 
nationalist teachings of the Transylvanian School and preparing the way for the 
future national education system. This in turn created the conditions for the 
intellectual emancipation of Romanian elites that made possible a Romanian 1848, 
the establishment of the first Romanian state in 1859 and its independence in 1877 
(Bădărău 1987: 10-11; 164-165; Bochmann 2010: 107; Mitu 2001: 64). It was 
also in this context that Kogălniceanu imposed his understanding of national 
history at the Mihăilean Academy (Bădărău 1987: 103-105). Its principles were 
transferred after 1860 at the University of Iaşi, while a similar transfer was 
made from Saint Sava Academy to the University of Bucharest in 1864. 
At that time, the concept of history itself was unclear among Romanian 
intellectuals. Educated under the influence of Herder’s understanding of the 
nation (Escudier 2010: 73; Spiridon 2009: 153), Kogălniceanu explained his 
theory of national history at the Mihăilean Academy in 1843. This is considered 
nowadays as having inaugurated the Romanticist school of Romanian 
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historiography aiming to educate patriotic citizens with ‘national breath’. The 
respective discourse was also important because Kogălniceanu praised Michael the 
Brave, who had united Walachia, Moldova and Transylvania in 1599, thus presenting 
the emerging academia with a hero and a political ideal (Bădărău 1987: 106-107; 
Boia 2001: 41). The fragment below (Kogălniceanu 1967: 107, my translation; 
for another English version, see Mitu 2001: 186) confirms the centrality of historical 
science in Kogălniceanu’s view of Romanian ethno-political ontology: 
 
We are in urgent need for a history of our country, even if only for the defence of 
our rights against the foreign nations. While we still lack a history, any foreign enemy will 
feel he has a right to come and say […]: “The beginning of your people is unknown, the 
name you bare is not yours, nor the land you inhabit [...] forget your origins, rid your 
name, or take the name I will give you, pack up your things and leave the land you live on, 
for it is not yours […].” 
 
The quotation indicates clearly the fundamental role played by national 
onomastics and the production of a national version of history in the 
(f)actualisation of the imagined community. The nation’s political ontology was 
thus built on a discourse of national sovereignty inseparable from the 
subjectivity speaking sovereignly in the name of the nation, and the spatial and 
temporal coordinates of that subjectivity. These ideas became leitmotif of the 
patriotic intellectuals actively involved in the revolutionary movement of 1848 
in Moldova and Walachia and announced the ‘vernacular mobilisation’ toward 
the engineering of the ethnic nation (Smith 2000: 72) in the independent 
Romania after 1877. 
In practice, this mobilisation started with the intensive ‘ethnicisation of 
Romanian linguistic conscience’ in the footsteps of the Transylvanian School 
(Escudier 2010: 73). Soon after 1848, Bălcescu published a book titled History 
of Romanians under Voivode Michael the Brave arguing for the national 
unification as ‘the dearest dream of the great Romanian voivodes’. This was the 
first treatise in which ‘the medieval history of the Romanians, of the three 
Romanian lands, was explicitly treated as national history’ (Boia 2001: 41-42; 
original emphasis). A systematic affirmation of a Romanian historical presence 
and the colonisation of political time with national onomastics can then be said 
to have effectively started with the works by Kogălniceanu and Bălcescu in the 
mid-eighteenth century. 
The political effects of this predication of time were to become evident 
once Kogălniceanu become not only the undisputed ideological leader of the 
self-determination movement, but also the first prominent politician in united 
Romania after 1859. His commitment to the national cause was beyond any 
doubt as he even continued to give national history courses without payment at 
the Academy in Iaşi and also initiated in 1840 a nationalist literary movement 
with the short-lived but influential Dacia Literară (Bădărău 1987: 106; 
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Gledhill 2005: 363). As Prime Minister and Member of Parliament after 1859, 
Kogălniceanu’s conception of national sovereignty was to be decisive in the 
formulation of citizenship and education policies, hence on the production of 
the nation’s objective presence. And it will be this ethno-presence that will 
condition political possibilities and inter-ethnic relations under Romanian 
sovereignty for the generations to come.  
Glimpses of a unitary national education system in vernacular Romanian 
had already emerged in Moldova and Walachia under the Organic Regulations 
(Bădărău 1987: 58-59, 61-63). Courses of history and geography were 
particularly designed to Romanianise time and space, while insisting on an 
ethnic definition of the nation in terms of blood ties (Murgescu 2001: 268-269). 
The theme of the Romanian nation being ‘the most ancient’ in its fatherland 
(Mitu 2001: 221), originating in the Transylvanian School, was omnipresent in 
the curriculum. During the years toward the 1859 union of Moldova and 
Walachia, the society was also becoming increasingly xenophobic, public abhorrence 
of mixed marriages (McMahon 2009: 105) being accompanied by political 
discourses targeting the Jews as threats to the nascent Romanian middle class 
(Feldman 1979: 53). Such conditions facilitated the birth, after 1859, of a 
constitutional discourse overtly against the rich Jewish minority. 
The union of Walachia and Moldova in 1859 marked the birth of the first 
sovereign Romanian state, officially named United Principalities and legalised 
later with the 1866 Constitution under the foreign Prince Carol I Hohenzollern. 
By that time, a policy of ‘bureaucratic nationalism’ (Iordachi 2001: 163) had 
already produced a national administration supporting the Romanian Orthodox 
Church and the local businesses against foreign elements (Iordachi and Trencsényi 
2003: 425-426; Korkut 2006: 137; Stan and Turcescu 2007: 18-21). The very 
coming of Carol I on the throne was insistently motivated by prominent Liberal 
Party politician I.C. Brătianu as European solution to Romanians’ centennial 
servitude to Oriental enemies (Iordache 1997: 27-29). Creating a national 
identity built therefore on xenophobia with roots deep in regional history. 
The process leading to the legal formulation of a Romanian citizenship in 
1866 was also circumscribed to this general context in which Romanianhood 
was stridently associated with Western values, while non-Romanians were exiled 
somewhere on the Oriental side of mental maps (Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 384ff; 
Iordachi 2001: 159). The dominant discourse regarding these issues was conservative 
rather than liberal, despite of being reputedly inspired by the French and 
Belgian constitutions of the time (Boia 2001: 90-91; Gallagher 2008: 22; Iijima 
2010: 312-315; Iordache 1997: 57; Iordachi 2001: 159-161). Its targets were 
especially the Greek Ottomans and the Jews who were economically dominant 
before 1859 (Korkut 2006: 133; Leuştean 2007: 730; Livezeanu 1995: 4).  
Iordachi has documented that the discourse of citizenship and national 
sovereignty around the 1866 Constitution prioritised the principle of jus 
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sanguinis defining the political community in the ethno-language of blood ties 
between members (2001: 164). Indeed, the first and third articles of the charter 
proclaimed the nation as unitary and indivisible while ‘colonisation’, i.e. land 
ownership by foreigners was explicitly forbidden (Romanian Constitution 1866). 
As to leave no room for a civic understanding of the nation, which would have 
benefited the Greek Ottomans and the Jews, the Constitution also conflated 
citizenship with Romanian ethno-identity under the notion of ‘Romanianhood’ 
and ethnic minorities were not mentioned at all. The words for “citizen” 
(cetăţean) and “citizenship” (cetăţenie) cannot be found anywhere in the text. 
Instead, all ethnically non-Romanian inhabitants were named ‘aliens’ (streini), of 
whom only Christians were declared eligible for Romanianhood, i.e. citizenship 
(Romanian Constitution 1866: Title II). Article 82 also demanded that the heirs 
of Catholic German Prince Carol I convert to Romanian Orthodox Christianity, thus 
placing national onomastics in tandem with the dominant religious denomination at 
the top of hierarchies and denying political rights to non-Christians (see also 
Iordache 1997: 193; Korkut 2006: note 44; Leuştean 2007: 718). 
The establishment of the first Romanian sovereignty turned in this way 
the word rumân from a notion with social connotations and indicating at best an 
“imagined community” into ethno-onomastics of a political community. With 
the 1866 Constitution, this ethno-name clearly became a principle of the 
nation’s (f)actualisation as objective presence, which in itself excluded all not 
fitting its sanguine definition. The consequences for non-Romanians were 
palpably objective, too, as the Jews in particular became a target of economic 
discrimination after many of them run away from the oppressive Habsburg 
policies in Galicia to the new Romanian state (Feldman 1979: 53). 
Kogălniceanu’s view set the dominant discourse in this context yet again. A 
pragmatic politician, he supported religious rights being granted to minorities 
but had insisted in the Moldovan Assembly as early as 1857 that political rights 
be reserved to Christians only for ‘consolidating the Romanian nationality’ 
through the ‘rejection of differences’ (Kogălniceanu 1967: 208).  
The anti-Jewish constitutional article 7 was to be eliminated later 
following pressure from European powers (Iijima 2010: 314; Ioanid 2004: 424; 
Iordachi 2001: 169-170). Nevertheless, it indicated the xenophobia implicit in 
the dominant political discourse of the time aiming to exclude ethnic others 
from the nation as community of prosperity (Gallagher 2008: 21-22). The state 
eventually granted citizenship rights to the Jews but on individual basis and 
only around 2000 of them enjoyed this status after 1878 (Ioanid 2004: 424; 
Turda 2008: 443-444). The property policy of the United Principalities after gaining 
independence will confirm the perpetuation of anti-minorities political attitudes. 
Following the declaration of independence from Ottomans on 9 May 1877 
(Kogălniceanu 1967: 315), the United Principalities fought on the Russian side 
against the Porte. Victory in the 1877-1878 war and support from the international 
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community led to the country’s becoming the sovereign Kingdom of Romania 
(Old Kingdom) in 1881, with Carol I as crowned head of state. The territory was 
also enlarged with the annexation of Dobrogea. In the new configuration, 
Romanians represented a solid majority of 92 per cent out of the Kingdom’s 
total population of almost six million (Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 384-389, 400; 
Gallagher 2008: 22-23). Turks and Tatars had been dominant for centuries in 
Dobrogea where they represented approximately 30 per cent of the population 
and owned around 50 per cent of the land. Intensive colonisation with ethnic 
Romanians and aggressive land property policies under an 1882 law following 
the 1866 constitutional provisions on citizenship led to the ethnic majority 
reaching 63 per cent in land ownership by 1905 (Iordachi 2001: 172-175).3 
The legislation on national citizenship was therefore, indeed, a dynamic 
concept of political design with practical value and effective agency of social 
change (Sommers 1993). From the methodological perspective adopted here, 
this meant the discursive production of a Romanian objective presence with 
doubly determining the political ontology: it instituted the (f)actuality of the 
imagined community, while concomitantly excluding ethnic others from that 
(f)actuality. The institution of the nation’s historical presence completed the 
ethnicisation of political time.  
Analyses of political discourses in public schools between 1831 and 1877 
suggest the imposition of particular ideal type of Romanian individuality. This 
was a ‘good’ Christian, preferably a peasant symbolising the ethnic purity of rural 
life by comparison with the urban mosaic (Mincu 2009: 58; Murgescu 1999: 43). 
The rural space thus became an idyllic ‘ethnoscape’ (Smith 1999: 150) of a 
people depicted in educational literature as a ‘linguistically and ethnically 
organic community’ (Mincu 2009: 59). Such literature implicitly discouraged 
then a public sense of the multicultural social (f)actuality, whose political 
temporality became gradually dominated by the ethnic majority. 
To this end, the public education system developed relatively fast 
curricula predicating the nation’s objective and historical presence in relation of 
reciprocal legitimisation. The already ethnicised political nowness was 
obviously the locus of the sovereign subjectivity authoring the dominant 
discourse in this context. For instance, a reading book for elementary schools 
published in 1871 Romanianised all history of all people in the country based 
on the sole evidence that majority were speaking Romanian in 1871. The 
textbook contained no chapter or section informing students about ethnic 
minorities. Instead, it taught that a “true Romanian” was only one born from 
Romanian parents, speaking Romanian language and sharing with brethren the 
same customs and religion. Additionally, a “Romanian” vowed to fight aliens 
                                                          
3
  Eminov (2000: 133) prefers less certainty concerning data due to the unreliability of sources. 
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living in the country, a view also shared by the members of the national agency 
responsible for the respective curriculum (Murgescu 2001: 270-271).  
The early Romanian public instruction thus narrowed considerably the 
public conception of political possibilities. The society grew during that age with an 
idea of political normality in which religiously non-Christian Orthodox and 
ethnically non-Romanian people could/should not enjoy equal political status with 
the “true” Romanians. And the high level of illiteracy (Gallagher 2008: 23-24; 
Livezeanu 1995: 30-31) meant that such overtly xenophobic views would easily 
penetrate deep in the society especially after the efficiency of the public 
instruction increased with the Haret reforms (Iordachi 2001: 181-182; Livezeanu 
1995: 30-33). This may have been in fact an important factor making possible the 
profoundly anti-Semitic “patriotism” of the fascist regime in Romania a few 
decades later. And, in a political and cultural context dominated by Kogălniceanu 
(1967: 241) proclaiming the peasantry ‘the foundation of our nationality’, the 
village was soon to become the source and end of societal ethno-patriotism from 
which even the communists would draw ideological energy later. 
Toward the twentieth century, a growing historiography was focusing on 
Transylvania as Romania’s ancient ethnoscape. Xenopol, an overtly anti-Semitic 
academic (Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002: 222), published the first complete 
history of the Romanians in six volumes between 1888 and 1893. This popularised 
the thesis that the Carpathians were the nation’s natural fortress enclosing the 
cradle of Dacian-Roman symbiosis and Latin continuity, i.e. the Transylvanian 
plain (Boia 2001: 116). Synchronised with this theme was the insistence in much of 
the relevant literature of the time on the Asian origins of the Hungarians and on 
their invasion of Transylvania much after the Roman rule in the province. 
This Romanticist nationalism imitating Western originals took an 
autochthonous turn under the influence of the Junimea (Youth) cultural movement 
initiated by Titu Maiorescu. Junimea represented a strong intellectual reaction 
to the excessive imports from Western (especially French) cultures invading 
Romanian public discourse as ‘forms without content’ and encouraged instead 
the search for ‘national originality’ in literature (Maiorescu 1966: 395; see also 
Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 391; Mitu 2001: 96-97). History writing was a central 
target of Junimist criticism for excessive patriotic pathos and lack of attention to 
method (Boia 2001: 58; Lovinescu 1972: 292; Maiorescu 1966: 402). However, 
xenophobia was at the heart of this discourse, too, its claimed autochthonism 
signalling an inward oriented speaking subjectivity.  
Benefiting from authoritative voices, among them national poet Eminescu, 
historians Xenopol and Iorga, philosophers Conta and Rădulescu-Motru, 
popular writers Haşdeu and Creangă and playwright Caragiale, the Junimist 
conservative autochthonism dominated political culture in the beginning of the 
twentieth century (Heinen 2010: 455-469; Mitu 2001: 97-103). With Maiorescu 
serving as Foreign and Prime Minister between 1910 and 1914, the 
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administration operated with a unitary, ethnic conception of the nation, of its 
history and its form of government. And this was the dominant view of politics 
toward the union with Transylvania in 1918. Despite alternative perspectives 
being also popular at the time (Boatcă 2006: 563-564), the autochthonist camp 
managed to impose in public conscience its disliking of the European-oriented 
“romantic” patriotism of 1848, with strong French influences, and promoted 
instead a self-centred nationalism of German inspiration.  
Europeanism and nationalist autochthonism were to remain the two major 
options of the Romanian society and were reflected in domestic politics for the 
next generations (Bochmann 2010: 122; Boia 2001: 59; Gallagher 2008: 26). 
The perpetuation of this cultural dichotomy was aided by the emergence and 
then survival of authoritarianism in various forms, from King Carol II and 
Marshal Antonescu after 1938 until the first democratic change in 1996. The 
next sections will therefore insist not on the causes and conditions that facilitated 
authoritarian regimes in Romania, but on their contributions to the perpetuation 
of state nationalism, which deepened inter-ethnic inequality of status. 
 
 
The Authoritarian Age of the Romanian Sovereign Self 
 
The diplomatic jousts in Paris at the end of the First World War allowed 
for the proliferation of nation-states in Eastern Europe, the Greater Romania 
being also established with Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina attached to 
the Romanian Kingdom in 1920 (Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 418-421; Gallagher 
2008: 28-29). This unification also meant that a significant number of foreign 
ethnic groups entered the human domain of Romanian sovereignty. In the “Old 
Kingdom”, ethnic minorities (mostly Jews, Roma, Tatars and Turks) had 
amounted to less than eight per cent of the total population while around 30 per 
cent were ethnically non-Romanian in 1920 (Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 420; 
Gallagher 2008: 23; Hitchins 1992: 169-170). Hungarians formed the largest 
minority with almost eight per cent of Romania’s 13 million citizens and a 
concentration of almost 30 per cent in Transylvania. Around 20 per cent of the 
entire population was made of other minorities, including Germans, Ukrainians, 
Russians, Bulgarians, Roma, Jews and others (Gallagher 2008: 29; Korkut 
2006: 133; Livezeanu 1995: 9-10). In this multicultural context, the central 
authorities in Bucharest continued to impose the objective and historical 
presence of the ethnic majority conditioning political life with the 1923 
Constitution expanding the principles established in 1866 (Iijyma 2010: 312, 314). 
Despite certain positive provisions addressing ethnic minorities, the 1923 
charter predicated them exclusively in terms of rights, i.e. as objects of the 
minority policies of the ethno-national sovereignty. It affirmed the unitary, 
indivisible and centralised character of the state, which was to be reflected, for 
DRAGOȘ MATEESCU 50 
instance, in legislative acts nationalising the education system (Livezeanu 1998: 23). 
Moreover, the nation’s objective presence was subtly ethnicised. On the surface 
the charter promoted an apparently civic understanding of Romanian citizenship 
by granting freedom of conscience (Article 5), civil rights and equality before 
the law (Articles 7 and 8), the right to association (Articles 28 and 29) and the 
right to serve in the armed forces (Article 19) regardless of ethnic, linguistic or 
religious belonging (Romanian Constitution 1923). However, this effacing of 
cultural differences being operated in (f)actual life by the ethnic majority 
inevitably strengthened the ‘ethnic Romanian character of the new state’ 
(Gallagher 2008: 30). 
Despite containing, unlike the 1866 charter, the words ‘citizen’ (cetăţean) 
and ‘citizenship’ (cetăţenie), the 1923 Constitution did not define Romanian 
citizenship. The word “Romanian” appears both in adjectival and substantive 
form and is used to name all citizens irrespective of (f)actual ethnic identities, 
thus confirming their subordination to the ethno-political definition of the state. 
Article 126 also imposed Romanian as sole official language. Consequently, 
non-Romanians remained protected only in articles explicitly referring to individual 
rights and not as separate ethno-cultural communities (Iijima 2010: 314). In this 
sense, the Constitution did reflect to some extent the provisions of the 1919 
Minority Treaties under the League of Nations and promised certain political 
rights (Iordachi 2001: 183). It also facilitated the granting of citizenship to the 
nearly 770,000 Jews already inhabiting the Old Kingdom (Brunstein and 
Ronnkvist 2002: 212-213).  
However, the protection of minority communities was insured only with 
reference to relevant international treaties and reflected their weaknesses 
(Freeman 2002: 30-33, 114; Jackson Preece 2005: 13, 155, 166). And, as seen 
above, the domestic political elites were already guided by the imperative of 
elevating a common political identity that overwhelmed other ethnicities with 
its apparent civic form but an ethno-logic of national sovereignty in content. 
This was also confirmed with the Romanian Orthodox Church being grated the 
dominant position in the religious order under state protection (Leuştean 2007: 728). 
Additionally, the 1921 Land Reform, aiming primarily at reducing the Bolshevik 
control in Bessarabia (Gallagher 2008: 30), was also to affect the ethnic 
minorities by allowing for the confiscation of land from small and medium-size 
properties, minority schools and religious establishments (Illyés 1982: 90).  
The 1925 Public Administration Act introduced an oath of allegiance to 
Romanian sovereignty for all job applications in the public sector, including 
education, which led to many Romanians replacing Hungarians in Transylvanian 
administration. The implementation of specific provisions in that act also 
produced a new administrative organisation of the country, which diminished 
the role played by local minority communities (Culic 2006: 176-177; Illyés 
1982: 91-92). Despite formally granting legal equality to all ethnic groups, the 
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1923 Constitution was also far from helpful in solving the older Jewish problem 
of citizenship in Bessarabia where 80,000 Jews remained not registered as 
Romanian citizens with property rights in 1928 (Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002: 213; 
Livezeanu 1995: 123). 
The considerable enlargement of Romanian territory after 1920 made the 
administration fear especially Russian and Hungarian irredentism; an intensive 
policy of Romanianisation was therefore implemented in the newly acquired 
provinces (Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002: 223). This was accompanied by a 
renewed state activism promoting the economic interests of ethnic Romanians 
in continuation of pre-1923 practices. Successive governments implemented 
protectionist economic policies aiming to eliminate the foreign capital and 
enhance the Romanian control of infrastructure and of the main industries 
against foreigners from within and without (Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 437-438; 
Daskalov 1997: 151). Economic protectionism also worked hand in hand with a 
conception of the Romanian nation as rural and agricultural in the depths of its 
collective soul on which the fascist and communist regimes were soon to capitalise. 
It was in the early 1930s that the Romanian politics became tolerant of the 
criminal mixture of authoritarianism and national sovereignty discoursed in 
ethno-racist terms. The dominant public discourse in this context, much influenced 
by Junimist autochthonism (Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 391; Hitchins 1992: 1072-1073), 
was one of distrust toward liberal democracy and capitalism while sympathetic to 
Italian and German nationalist authoritarianisms. State corporatism was seen as 
ideal solution for protecting and promoting a Romanian industry and especially 
agriculture, the village being portrayed as the hearth of the Romanian nation.  
This perspective was promoted among others by the influential Mihail 
Manoilescu whose view of ethnic minorities became clear in the 1930s when he 
would assert that Romania had no social but ethnic problems. In this context he 
identified capitalism with the Jewry that had to be eliminated through a 
revolution (Ioanid 2004: 440). The fascist Legionary movement will come to 
power in 1940 to fulfil such desiderata and its principles will dominate 
government under the dictatorship of Marshal Antonescu until the end of the 
Second World War. 
These developments marked in fact the victory of conservative 
autochthonism distrustful of liberalism and disliking Europeanisation. The 
profound division between these two intellectual currents – nationalist 
autochthonism and Europeanism – marked the country’s political modernity 
(Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 391-395; Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003: 416-417; 
Hitchins 1992: 1073; Korkut 2006: 134). However, the much higher popularity 
and the access to power of the autochthonist discourse of ‘endogenous 
ethnospecificity’ (Mincu 2009: 60) indicates that the ethno-nationalist card had 
been the winning one from the outset. Literary journals, especially Cuvântul 
(The Word) and Gândirea (The Thinking), were particularly influential in this 
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context. Their intellectual prestige arose with valuable contributions from 
cultural icons such as Lucian Blaga, Mircea Eliade, Constantin Brâncuşi, Eugen 
Ionescu, Mircea Vulcănescu, Emil Cioran and others. 
However, these publications gradually shifted toward an extreme 
nationalist discourse supporting the fascist movement. Manoilescu, Iorga, 
Alexandru C. Cuza, Nae Ionescu and Nichifor Crainic were among those 
promoting such discourse, which echoed the anti-Semitic predication of national 
sovereignty in the previous century. And the accession of some of them to 
various positions in the legislative and the executive branches of government 
placed these views at the heart of political power (Alexandrescu 2002: 159; 
Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 426; Bejan 2006: 115; Bochmann 2010: 123; Ioanid 
2004: 432, 469). Iorga’s enormous oeuvre in historiography in particular had a 
lasting impact on the Romanian political culture. His works insisted on the 
agrarian essence of an idealised Romanian past and these ideas were reflected in 
his political career as Member of Parliament, President of the National Assembly, 
minister and Prime Minister until 1940. In Iorga’s theory, the ideal rural Romania 
was ‘ethnically pure’ (Ioanid 1992: 470) and religiously defined by an ethnicised 
Orthodoxy (Boia 2001: 119-120; Iordachi 2001: 171; Turda 2008: 446). 
The effects of the violent peasant uprisings of 1907 and of economic 
decline after the Great Depression made extreme nationalism and anti-Semitism 
the winning political card in the 1930s. The Romanian youth especially was 
more and more ready to rally behind popular rightist intellectuals who favoured 
a narrow, Orthodox Christian identity of the nation clearly contrasting with the 
Jewish and Hungarian Catholic alterity. Orthodoxy was in fact so versatile that 
soon became part of the racial conception of the nation (Brunstein and 
Ronnkvist 2002: 221; Ioanid 1992: 473; McMahon 2009). The ideals of that 
generation of politicians were summarised by philosopher Nae Ionescu in tree 
words: Orthodoxy, nationalism, and monarchy (Bochmann 2010: 123; 
Boia 2001: 146-147).  
The political atmosphere growing increasingly hostile to non-Romanians 
was also reflected in the education policy, which would instil the state’s 
nationalism in future generations. Constantin Angelescu, reformer of public 
instruction in the interwar period, made the imposition of a common political 
identity to all people an imperative of this policy, as expressed in three pieces of 
legislation in 1924, 1925 and 1928. Textbooks were to formulate the nation’s 
historical presence cleared of ethnic impurities, the education policy aiming 
overall to impose ‘teaching (in Romanian) of Romanian language, history, 
geography, and civics in non-Romanian schools’ (Livezeanu 1995: 44-45). In 
the new territories, this effort was particularly intense as it had to eliminate 
competition from foreign elites that grew under former Austro-Hungarian, or 
Tsarist rule. The target was explicitly, indeed, the creation of an educated 
Romanian majority ‘whose mobility to elite status the state now encouraged’ 
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(Livezeanu 1995: 47-48). The reorganisation of the education system was 
entrusted to Onisifor Ghibu, a nationalist educator who summarised the 
principles of the reform as follows (ibid.: 155): 
 
The day of December 1, 1918, inaugurates a new world: Românism 
[Romanianhood] has become free and its own master. It must build for itself its own state 
and set its own mission in this world. In this historic work, what role belongs to school 
and education? [...] The oppression of the Maghyar language [in Transylvania], [...] 
history, and [...] geography has fallen [...]. In high schools and the University instead of 
the Maghiar language, the French, English, and Italian languages [will be taught]. 
Romanian language, [...] history, [... and] geography [will serve] the purpose of 
consolidating a new state and founding a nation. 
 
The curricula reflected the offensive nationalism of the unified kingdom. 
A history book by Ion Popescu-Băjenaru was given the “Angelescu” Award by 
the Romanian Academy in 1925 for presenting the ‘popular masses’ with a 
story of the ‘millennial’ development of the nation and for its patriotic spirit 
(Popescu-Băjenaru 1925: 1). The Academy was thus licensing an idea, inherited 
from previous generations, of the national temporality stretching far beyond 
scientific evidence, hence excluding non-Romanianhood from regional history. 
Faithful to the Romanticists’ ethnic conception of Orthodoxy, Popescu- 
Băjenaru’s “story” also built on the erroneous but politically lucrative idea that 
Christianity appeared north of Danube ‘ever since the Roman settlement in 
Dacia’ (ibid.: 30).  
The fact that even today archaeologists cannot offer reliable evidence 
concerning the beginning of Christianity on the left bank of the Danube 
(Ahonen 2007: 23; Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 104) was not a matter of concern to 
the author and the Academy. Scientific accuracy did not matter since the public 
discourse and state policies were already dominated by the idea of the temporal 
simultaneity of and organic bond between Romanianhood and Orthodoxy for 
two thousand years (Stan and Turcescu 2007: 48). Given the absence from 
Popescu-Băjenaru’s textbook of any structured account of ethnic and religious 
minorities, it is clear that the respective work served only the radical 
individuation and anthropomorphisation (Heidegger 1962: 62) of the imagined 
community in a form of historical presence that inherently and concomitantly 
excluded ethnic otherness. 
The same hostility permeated a high-school textbook penned by Iorga and 
published six years later. It perpetuated similar (Iorga 1931: 34, 36-37) and 
other myths while referring to minorities only in pejorative tone. The land 
inhabited by the Romanian brethren, or neam, within or without national 
borders was named by Iorga ‘Romanian land’ regardless of actual state borders 
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(ibid.: 4).4 The Romanian ethnoscape was thus dangerously expanding in the 
minds of very young pupils at a time when revisionism was yet again 
threatening the continent. It is however important to note that, from the 
perspective of the methodology adopted here, the (f)actualisation of this 
ethnoscape was engineered through the onomastic engineering of political 
nowness, the nation’s objective presence legitimising both its historical 
presence and the abusive nationalisation of space. The entire section under the 
title ‘Romanian Land’ (Iorga 1931: 3-7) in the respective textbook portrays the 
Romanian people as having dwelled in the region from times immemorial and 
thus being incontestably entitled to master political nowness.  
The immense intellectual prestige of Iorga contributed decisively to the 
long-term establishment of an understanding of history – inherited from 
previous generations – that blurred the line between patriotism and science 
(Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 392; Bejan 2006: 123; Boia 2001: 17). The imagined 
Romanian community thus became a onto-political ‘reality’ (Hitchins 1992: 1067; 
Turda 2008: 447) (f)actualised in popular conscience by generations of intellectuals 
from Kogălniceanu, to Xenopol and Iorga. At the centre of this tradition was 
undoubtedly a perception of the nation as objective presence instituting its own 
political nowness in terms profoundly inimical to ethno-religious otherness. The 
political alliance between Iorga and nationalist extremist A. C. Cuza, both 
initiated in German political philosophies by Maiorescu, only confirmed that 
racial-nationalism represented the winning card in domestic politics at that time 
(Brustein and Ronnkvist: 220; Trencsényi 2010: 348-349, 352; Turda 2008: 446).  
Themes such as the nation’s historical continuity, the organic link 
between Orthodox Christianity and Romanianhood, and the rural essence of the 
ethno-nation also benefited from their propagation in valuable literary works, 
such as Lucian Blaga’s Mioritic Space (1936) and Trilogy of Culture (1944). 
While avoiding overt nationalism, this remarkable poet and philosopher 
portrayed the nation as born from the timeless purity of the village (1994: 166; 
1995: 130) whence it ‘boycotted’ history (Blaga 1985: 307) with superiority 
over other nations (Boia 2001: 146; Korkut 2006: 136; Tănăsoiu 2005: 125). 
Accompanying Blaga’s mysticism in the interwar period were other popular 
writers, such as Nichifor Crainic and Nae Ionescu.  
Crainic’s accession to the top editorial position at Gândirea turned that 
journal in the mouthpiece of Romanian peasantist fascism in the 1930s, which 
called for the state to become the embodiment of the racial nation, the 
monarchy, and Orthodoxy (Bejan 2006: 117-118; Hitchins 1992: 1073-1074; 
Leuştean 2007: 730; Turda 2008: 447). In typical Junimist tradition, Crainic and 
his followers accused the Europeanist elites for proposing a superficial 
                                                          
4
  Neam and popor are Romanian words for kinship and the community of language, 
implying relations similar to family relations between descendants of the same ancestor, as in the 
German Volk (see, for instance, Neumann 2010; Csergo 2007: 37). 
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Romanian culture that lacked religious substance. Resonating with this view 
was metaphysician Nae Ionescu for whom Romanianhood and Orthodoxy were 
ontologically so much bound together that belonging to another religion meant 
automatic exclusion from the nation (Leuştean 2007: 729; Ornea 1995: 91-95). 
Theoretician of Romanian existentialism, Ionescu saw the West through 
Spenglerian lenses as succumbing to technologism while the Romanian culture 
could survive through its mystical, Orthodox spirituality, which had to be 
protected by and ethnocratic, organic, i.e. not contractual, regime (Bărbulescu 
et al. 1998: 426; Hitchins 1992: 1074; Ornea 1995: 71). 
Nae Ionescu’s influence on the interwar generation was enormous and he 
turned the high-quality journal Cuvântul into an extreme nationalist tribune 
(Bejan 2006: 117; Livezeanu 1995: 273). Part of that generation were would-be 
icons of Romanian culture, such as Mircea Eliade and Emil Cioran, who 
became supporters of the fascist Iron Guard, or Eugen Ionescu, Mihail 
Sebastian and Lucian Blaga, who eventually refrained from explicit political 
positions (Bejan 2006: 115; Hitchins 1992: 1074; Quinney 2007: 451). 
Nationalism of various intensities was, nevertheless, the norm of the day and it 
came as no surprise when it made the core of the Iron Guard’s fascist ideology.  
In September 1940, the Guard took power for 131 days under general Ion 
Antonescu as Prime Minister and its ideology remained at the heart of the state 
under Antonescu’s subsequent personal regime until the end of World War Two 
and the establishment of the communist regime in 1947. While the attitude of 
the fascist state to the Hungarian minority remained reserved due to the wartime 
alliance with Budapest (Ioanid 1992; Gesin 2007: 66; Solonari 2006: 448), 
other minorities were brutally treated. The Jewish community especially 
suffered from the criminal acts of the Antonescu administration, hundreds of 
thousands of Jews being murdered in Romania and Transdnestria during the war 
(Deletant 2006: 127; Gesin 2007).  
These crimes were in fact subordinated to the imperative of purifying and 
Romanianising the country, which made victims among other minorities, too 
(Deletant 2006: 116-120, 128-130; Eminov 2000: 134). Antonescu was 
considered a symbol of ethno-nationalism and could retain power at a time 
when such attitudes were dominant in Romanian society after long decades of 
nationalist education hostile to internal ethnic others (Ioanid 2004: 434-435; 
Solonari 2006: 474-480). He gave in 1941 an honest expression of the values 
that those generations were raised with: ‘That was how I grew up, with hatred 
against the Turks, Jews, and Hungarians. This sentiment of hatred against the 
enemies of the patria must be pushed to the last extreme. I take upon myself that 
responsibility’ (quoted in Neumann 2010: 396). 
The feelings that animated Antonescu’s political and military actions 
were shared by large segments of the society. Romania joined Germany’s effort 
in the Second World War with the aim of recovering Bessarabia from Soviet 
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Russia and northwest Transylvania from Hungary, and with the hope of 
eliminating the communist threat to the Romanian capitalist society. The 
Patriarch of the Orthodox Church himself called for a ‘holy war’ against the 
Soviet ‘nation without God’ (Leuştean 2007: 734). Defeat in war led 
nevertheless to the Red Army taking control of business in Eastern Europe. 
And, since there were only around 1000 members of the communist party at the 
end of the war (Chirot 1978: 460; Petrescu 2009: 526), Moscow appealed to the 
oppressed Jewish, Hungarian and other minorities to recruit supporters 
(Gallagher 2008: 44). 
Hungarians, representing 12 per cent of the population in 1945 (Deletant 
1995: 108), had contributed significantly to the ranks of communists in interwar 
Romania (Gallagher 2008: 44-47; Tismăneanu 2005: 88). After the Second 
World War they also formed – together with Jews, Bulgarians, Russians, 
Ukrainians and others – the core of the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP) for 
around a decade (Chirot 1978: 460; Câmpeanu 1991: 813; Deletant 1995: 108; 
Petrescu 2009: 526; Ţârău 2006: 311-312). This multiethnic composition and 
the internationalist message of communism in general made of the short-lasting 
1948 Constitution, establishing the communist Romanian state, the most 
minority-friendly charter in the country’s history. Along with the specifically 
communist ideological precepts, the charter also adopted a non-ethnic definition 
of citizens who enjoyed equality before the law regardless of cultural 
differences (Romanian Constitution 1948: Article 16).  
For the first time, a Romanian constitution contained the word ‘Romanian’ 
only in adjectival, i.e. not substantival form. Concepts like ‘ethnicity’, or 
‘minority’ were also discarded from the political, administrative and legislative 
discourse following a decision in 1944, since they was reminiscent of the racial 
superiority theory of the previous regime (Ţârău 2006: 307, note 2). Thus, the 
preferred term for ethnic minorities was that of ‘co-existing nationalities’ 
(Romanian Constitution 1948: Article 24), which implied some degree of inter-
ethnic equality before the superior imperatives of communism. This meant that 
a strong consensus of ethno-sovereignty was missing for the first time in 
Romanian history and inter-ethnic politics could take place to a certain extent.  
Representatives of ethnic minorities were co-opted in central and local 
government and under the Nationalities Status of 1945 the Hungarian language 
was used in public administration, RWP meetings, or in various economic 
sectors of public interest. The Hungarian-language Bolyai University was also 
established in 1946 while the Decree Law 629 of 3 August 1945 reaffirmed the 
constitutional definition of ethnic minorities as ‘co-existing nationalities’ (Culic 
2006: 178 and note 20). Then a new Constitution was adopted in 1952 to express 
legally the Soviet domination over its vassal communist regime in Bucharest.  
This charter preserved inter-ethnic equality and the primacy of communist 
ideals, the terms ‘minority’ and ‘ethnic’ being again absent from the text. It 
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granted the use of minority languages in education, local administration (Article 
82), and in courts (Article 68). Article 17j, however, announced the future 
return of state nationalism by proclaiming that, ‘the Romanian state, 
democratic-popular, unitary and independent, ensures the development of the 
Romanian people’s culture and the culture of national minorities, socialist in 
content, national in form’ (Romanian Constitution 1952). The formulation 
‘national minorities’ suggested the subordination of minority cultures to that of 
the nominal ethnicity, which will be confirmed by subsequent state practices 
until the end of the communist regime. 
On the surface, the 1950s represented a positive period for inter-ethnic 
relations in communist Romania. Minorities benefited from unprecedented 
government attention in line with Stalin’s internationalist policies (Atanasova 
2004: 362; Chirot 1978: 487-489; Eminov 2000: 134-136). The regime even 
established a Hungarian Autonomous District (HAD) in Transylvania where 
ethnic Hungarians represented over 77 per cent of the population and their 
language was used in schools and administration (Atanasova 2004: 362; Culic 
2006: 178; Deletant 1995: 109-110; Gallagher 2008: 46-47). However, this 
autonomy was far from functional and depended in fact on the good will of 
central authorities in Bucharest that soon took control of its key institutions. 
Moreover, the 1956 anti-communist uprising in Hungary and the Soviet military 
intervention were to affect dramatically the condition of minorities in general 
and of the Hungarian minority in particular. 
Within this context, the Soviet leadership started supporting new ruling 
groups, ‘ethnically as representative as possible,’ in its satellite states (Ţârău 
2006: 394-395). The communist regimes in Europe thus entered their nationalist 
phase. In Romania, this meant a return to the autochthonist predication of 
politics that will subordinate inter-ethnic relations to the “socialist nation”, an 
euphemism for the dominant position of the ethnic majority (Culic 2006: 179; 
Petrescu 2009; Ţârău 2005: 393). The communist elite and especially its leader, 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, increasingly feared the spread among ethnic 
Hungarians of anti-Soviet ideas emanating from Budapest (Bărbulescu et al. 
1998: 519-520; Chirot 1978: 488; Gallagher 2008: 54). Moreover, Gheorghiu-
Dej also initiated a policy of disengagement from Moscow’s lines. 
Within this context, the Hungarian Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca was 
forced in 1959 to merge with the Romanian Babeş University in a bilingual 
academic structure. As a consequence, the minority academics lost power of 
decision and the Hungarian pro-rector, his wife and five other professors 
committed suicide. Until the end of 1960, the distinct status of the Hungarian 
language was also eliminated at the Agricultural College and the Medical-
Pharmaceutical Faculty in Târgu-Mureş.  
All these episodes indicated a policy of integration aiming strategically in 
fact at diminishing the use of Hungarian language in public instruction by 
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promoting dual-language schools where Romanian language would eventually 
prevail (Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 520-521; Csergo 2007: 30-31; Culic 2006: 179; 
Deletant 1995: 112-113). Gheorghiu-Dej also eliminated his Hungarian, Jewish, 
and other minority rivals in the RWP, the party thus becoming dominated 
overwhelmingly by ethnic Romanians of which those with rural origins were 
especially preferred (Deletant 1995: 108-110; Gallagher 2008: 56-57; Korkut 
2006: 141-142; Verdery 1991: 104). As a result, the ethnic minority 
intelligentsia gradually disappeared from the first line of domestic politics 
especially after the summer of 1956 (Tismăneanu 2005: 191). Following the 
withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1958, Gheorghiu-Dej also engineered the 
elimination of Russian elements from the party structures. The ethno-nationalist 
essence of this approach was to be exacerbated under Nicolae Ceauşescu who 
implemented until 1989 a policy of national homogenisation through the 
assimilation of ethnic minorities in general and the Hungarian minority in 
particular (Chirot 1978: 488; Csergo 2007:30; Deletant 1995: 113; Gallagher 
2008: 62; Panayi 2000: 181; Petrescu 2009: 523). 
During Ceauşescu’s first year in power, the RWP became the Romanian 
Communist Party (RCP) and the Grand National Assembly adopted the 1965 
Constitution proclaiming the Socialist Republic. Some provisions in the text did 
guarantee the use of minority languages in education, the media, administration 
and courts (Romanian Constitution 1965: Articles 22, 109). The words 
“minority”, or “ethnic” did not appear in the text, while the word “Romanian” 
was employed only in adjectival, i.e. not substantival form. Instead, the phrase 
‘co-exiting nationalities’ returned and remained the preferred formulation of the 
regime addressing minorities until December 1989. However, despite the 
appearance of respect for non-Romanian ethnic communities, this constitutional 
language will allow in fact for their subordination to the ‘socialist nation’ (Culic 
2006: 180; Csergo 2007: 31; King 1973: 146-153). 
During the first decade of Ceauşescu’s rule, the RCP took some pro-
minority measures. A department of Hungarian language and literature was 
opened at the University of Bucharest, the Kriterion Publishing House was 
established to promote minority literature, and minority languages could be 
heard in radio and TV broadcasting, or in musical, theatrical and other artistic 
manifestations (Deletant 1995: 114; King 1973: 158; Panayi 2000: 150-151). 
However, the regime will soon adopt practices contrary to this apparent support 
for minority cultures.  
The first step in that direction was the Public Administration Law of 1968 
designed to produce an administrative basis for modernisation from above, 
preparing the country for the socialist industry and agriculture. The law in fact 
abolished the HAD and Ceauşescu then imposed a version of that act 
establishing not one but two Hungarian districts, Harghita and Covasna, where 
the power of the numerically superior ethnic Hungarians in the region was 
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diffused. And the ethnic Hungarians were anyway to be gradually replaced with 
Romanians in key administrative positions in the two districts (Atanasova 2004: 362; 
Deletant 1995: 113-115; Newall 1988: 4). A policy of forced industrialisation 
and urbanisation was also to determine the emigration of young Hungarian 
university graduates to industrialised cities outside their home region, ethnic 
Romanians being encouraged to replace them (Deletant 1995: 108; Gallagher 2008: 69; 
Korkut 2006: 146; Panayi 2000: 42). Such developments turned minorities in 
general and the Hungarian minority in particular from individualised cultural 
communities into mere objects of state policies aiming overall at homogenising 
the population into a malleable mass fit for socialist engineering.  
An important role in the process was played by the infamous political 
police, the Securitate, which had been acting against Hungarian, Jewish, 
German and other minority representatives ever since the beginning of 
communism in Romania (Securitate Directive 1951). In 1969, an article in the 
internal journal of this agency also mentioned concrete actions of the secret 
police against agents of Hungarian irredentism envisaging ‘the annexation to 
Hungary of a territory [Transylvania] where their co-nationals dwell’ (Kiss 
1969: 28). A 1978 issue from the same journal pointed again at the need for the 
neutralisation of ‘active elements that were part of former Hungarian, German, 
Ukrainian and other nationalist-fascist and irredentist organisations and parties’ 
(Derscanu 1978: 7). However, such actions addressed individuals involved in 
more or less subversive actions, while Ceauşescu’s policies of urbanisation and 
industrialisation affected entire ethnic communities and their cultural heritage. 
The most painful was the urbanisation, which culminated toward the end 
of the regime with a ‘systematisation programme’ aiming at the replacement of 
thousands of villages with agro-industrial complexes (Gallagher 2008: 64; 
Ronnas 1989: 543-546; Turnock 1991: 253-256). Despite the programme affecting 
clearly the entire population of Romania, it led in the end to the destruction of 
hundreds of Hungarian villages. Thousands of Romanians were also resettled in 
Transylvania, this modifying the majority-minority ratios in some regions 
(Atanasova 2004: 363; Csergo 2007: 129; Gallagher 2008: 62; Newall 1988; 
Turnock 1991: 259). The legislative and policy initiatives under Ceauşescu can thus 
be described as attempting to undermine the objective presence of minorities in the 
country’s public everydayness, this leaving the ethnic majority in dominant 
position. The nation’s historical presence was also insistently imposed. 
The total control of the public instruction meant however that the 
curricula was dominated by the RCP’s ideology, which gradually left behind the 
internationalist message of communism and reactivated themes from the local 
tradition of nationalist autochthonism. Minority language schooling declined 
under Ceauşescu (Csergo 2007: 155-159; Eminov 2000) and the Hungarian 
minority was particularly affected. The proportion of pupils taking courses in 
Hungarian language at pre-university level declined from 8 per cent in 1956 to 
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5.5 per cent in 1975, while at the university level the decline was from 5.4 in 
1970 to 3.7 per cent immediately after the fall of Ceauşescu (Csergo 2007: 157; 
Panayi 2000: 118-119). The American Helsinki Watch Committee signalled in 
this context that Hungarian-language schools were ‘systematically eliminated’ 
and the publisher of Hungarian textbooks Kriterion was closed by 1987. 
Additionally, entrance exams to secondary education were held in Romanian 
and Romanian teachers were systematically appointed to replace Hungarians 
(Newall 1988: 4). 
The content of education and especially the teaching of history 
represented, however, the main engine of assimilation. In the pre-Ceauşescu 
period, under coordination by the head communist ideologue Mihail Roller, the 
official discourse carefully securitised historical time by subordinating virtually 
all major events to the Romanians’ perpetual fight for national liberation from 
under the yoke of ethnic others. This produced the subtle imposition of the 
ethno-nation’s historical presence in the conscience of pupils and students 
regardless of their actual ethnic identity. All temporality on ‘Romanian’ lands 
was abusively populated with ‘Romanian’ heroes of the working class. The Roman 
colonisation of Dacia became mainly a process of ‘social differentiation’ 
followed by the ‘popular struggle for liberation’ (Roller 1952: 42-43). The 
result was a totalitarian historiography that the post-1965 regime will fill with 
ethno-national symbols. 
Ceauşescu signalled this move in 1966 by declaring publicly that Romania 
was not a multi-national, but a ‘united national state’ (Panayi 2000: 182). The 
abolishing of the HAD in 1968 gave factual sense to those words and by 1972 
he was openly speaking about ‘the goal of national and social homogenisation’ 
(Gallagher 2008: 62). The specific elements of the socialist homogenisation 
strategy were already given in the so-called ‘July Theses’ of 1971, considered by 
Tismăneanu as marking the beginning of Ceauşescu’s personality cult (2005: 242).  
He demanded that attention be given in all cultural forms to productions 
with a revolutionary character and counteracting the ‘not very becoming 
practice [...] of considering everything that is foreign to be better’ and the 
‘prostration before […] Western products’ (Ceauşescu 1972: 205). This 
‘cultural revolution’ aimed strategically at legitimising the leader’s personal 
control of the regime (Tismăneanu 2005: 242-244; Verdery 1991: 107). It 
presupposed stressing the place of the RCP and particularly Ceauşescu’s in the 
continuation of the Romanian medieval principalities, with special attention 
given to education (Culic 2006: 179-180; Petrescu 2009: 533). However, this 
was obviously just another episode in the then long tradition of cultural 
exercises in national narcissism and the securitisation of temporality that 
marked the entire history of Romanian sovereignty. 
At the heart of Ceauşescu’s strategy was the teaching of Romania’s 
history and geography guided by the principle of “protochronism” according to 
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which the Romanian nation predated all other ethnic groups in its own territory. 
This involved, yet again, the nationalisation of the past (Verdery 1991: Chapter 
6) that, from the methodological perspective adopted here, presupposed the 
imposition of the nation’s historical presence conditioning political ontology. 
The concept of protochronism meant the nation’s uniqueness and 
exceptionalism, which implied the unilateral ethnicisation of past and present, 
hence of future. The term itself was strongly connected with Ceauşescu’s ‘July 
Theses’. They inspired a Romanian literary critic of the time, Edgar Papu, to 
write in mid-1970s with some impulse from Mircea Eliade (Manea 1991: 34-35) 
a series of works (Papu 1974; 1977) claiming the ‘prophetic’ character of 
Romanian literature, i.e. predating and announcing major cultural movements in 
Europe (Boia 2001: 80; Verdery 1991: 175).  
Without rejecting the importance of synchronisation with European 
ideals, it was underlined that Europeanisation amounted to laggardness owing to 
the lack of attention to the original achievements in autochthonous Romanian 
culture (Papu 1977: 9; see also Hitchins 1992: 1078; Korkut 2006: 135). Thus, 
Papu’s notion of protochronism came in continuation of the long autochthonist 
line initiated by Junimea (Cioroianu 2002: 366), once again filling Romanian 
cultural forms with a nationalist content. It implied the engineering of ‘science 
of cultural otherness’ evident in the excessive attention given to ethnographic 
research and the abusive politicisation, yet again, of the iconic Romanian 
peasant (Mitu 2006: 80).  
The securitisation of the past through the construction of the nation’s 
historical presence in this context built on ‘a teleology of national continuity 
and an ideology of national values, premised on internal uniformity’ (Verdery 
1991: 131). With this historical presence occupying, under licence from the 
totalitarian regime, virtually the entire timeline of human history, the public 
predication of what was in fact a multicultural society became impossible in 
Romania. The exposure of pupils and students in the 1970s and 1980s to this 
engineering of time inevitably created then conditions for the perpetuation of 
state nationalism after 1989. 
Research dedicated to the cultural aspects of Ceauşescu’s policy of 
socialist homogenisation indicates that this intellectual tradition actually 
perpetuated the national identity formation process initiated around 1848 until 
our times (Petrescu 2007: 39). State nationalism inspired by this tradition 
became the official ideology of the regime in the 1970s and 1980s when 
protochronism saw a ‘brilliant career’ at the centre of virtually all forms of 
public art (Verdery 1991: 176). This was facilitated by the drastic curbing of the 
freedom of expression through government decrees, the first one issued in 1971, 
and in an atmosphere of terror engineered by the Securitate. Those who wanted 
their works published, including textbook authors, had to enter the lines of 
sycophant obedience toward the RCP leadership and propagate its socialist 
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ideology with a nationalist core (Bărbulescu et al. 1998: 542; Boia 2001: 80-81; 
Tismăneanu 2005: 250-252; Verdery 1991: 186). 
This led inevitably to the production of exaggerations and distortions of 
history even more ridiculous and dangerous than the pre-communist ones. 
Under unchallengeable state authority, the ancient Dacian kings, voivodes of the 
Middle Ages, revolutionaries of 1848, or anonymous communists and other 
selected historical figures gradually took the central public stage as characters in 
heavily ideologised versions of Romanian ethno-history (Boia 2001: 78-82, 
220-221; Brubaker 2004: 192; Petrescu 2009: 533; Verdery 1991: 224). Cohorts 
of more or less illustrious historical characters, all ethnicised Romanians, were 
to perform precise functions in the Party’s engineering of the communist 
temporality. The story of each of them was presented in propaganda materials 
and textbooks to somehow announce the self-proclaimed greatest Romanian 
leader in history, i.e. Ceauşescu himself and his epochal achievements. In this 
scheme, even Hungarian princes of the late thirteenth century were turned into 
fighters for Romanians’ liberation in Transylvania (Boia 2001: 222). 
Protochronism demanded as many events in the Romanianised history to 
be portrayed as anticipating major European events such as the French 
Revolution, the 1848 movements and especially socialism. An obscure text 
titled Teachings of Neagoe Basarab from the beginning of sixteenth century 
was even presented as superior to and announcing Machiavelli’s Prince, this 
defying an elementary sense of chronology. What mattered was that the 
Teachings were ‘Romanian’ and prefigured the national state’s authority, so 
brilliantly continued under Ceauşescu himself (ibid.: 80). A peasant uprising 
against feudal serfdom and inequality between Romanians and Hungarians in 
Transylvania toward the end of the nineteenth century also became “revolution” 
and interpreted as announcing the socialist liberation of working classes 
(ibid.: 80-81; Verdery 1991: 231-234).  
Also instrumental in the process was a massive cinematographic 
production abundant in themes such as the continuation of the Latin ethnic 
stock in Romania, the superiority of this civilisation to that of nomadic 
Hungarian and Slavic peoples, and Romanians’ historical struggle for 
independence against all enemies (Boia 2001: 221-222; Korkut 2006: 145; 
Petrescu 2007: 37-54). The national art festival Cântarea României (Praise to 
Romania) played a central role in this context. Initiated in 1976 and taking place 
annually until 1989, it was designed to homogenise public culture through 
regional and national activities of megalomaniac dimensions, gathering virtually 
all artistic manifestations (Petrescu 2009: 535-536).  
Participating in these efforts were most citizens, regardless of profession 
and ethno-religious identity. Central in these mega-manifestations were the 
historical myths propagated unabashedly by the regime. The figure of national 
poet Eminescu and the folkloric ballad Mioriţa, symbolising the connection 
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between the national soul and a universal eternity, were omnipresent (Manea 
1991: 35; Tănăsoiu 2008: 102-103). Even the roots of national communism 
were presented as originating in the communal life of ancient Dacia, which 
made Dacians particularly popular among sycophant historiographers 
(Cioroianu 2002: 366-367; Korkut 2006: 145-146). Previously politically 
incorrect figures, such as Lucian Blaga, also returned to the public discourse 
with the Cântarea României festival (Boia 2001: 148; Tănăsoiu 2008: 97-98). 
Ethnographic themes were borrowed even from the interwar, legionary past. 
These were cleared of Orthodoxism, catalogued conveniently by communist 
sociologists as ‘patriotic exaggerations’, and then integrated without scruples 
into the socialist culture (Marian-Bălaşa 2007: 198). 
Archaeologists, too, participated with significant contributions to the 
protochronist securitisation of historical time. The Ceauşescu regime extended 
the temporal line of ethno-historical continuity continuity from the 
archaeologically identifiable Dacian-Roman coexistence to ungraspable 
beginnings in pre-Roman, Dacian history (Cioroianu 2002: 366-367). Historians 
associated with the regime claimed that all Romanians descended directly from 
the Dacians. The communist authorities even organised in 1980 the celebration 
of 2050 years from the establishment of the first ‘centralised, unified and 
independent Dacian state’ as forerunner of centralised, unified and independent 
communist Romania. A most incredible exaggeration on this theme was the 
proclamation in the journal of the RCP’s Institute for the History of the Party of 
the Latin language being actually descended from Dacian (Boia 2001: 102-103).  
Under such conditions, one can accept the validity of Verdery’s assertion 
that the official discourse under the communist regime recasted temporality precisely 
to exclude ethnic minorities from the community of values (1991: 248-249). As 
a result, they were left indeed only with the role of scapegoats in times of 
economic and political hardships (Chen 2003: 169; Troie 2004: 41; Verdery 
1991: 86), which will culminate with the fall of the regime in 1989. The 
blaming of the ethnic minorities for the nation’s misfortunes was perpetuated, 
however, during and after Romanian revolution of 1989 (Petrescu 2010), and 
continues to mark the post-communist politics in Romania. 
 
 
By Way of Conclusion: the Unending Story of Ethnicised Temporality 
under Romanian Sovereignty 
 
State nationalism with authoritarian reflexes remained a feature of the 
post-communist regimes, too, even if in softer forms, under the 1991 Constitution 
speaking of the centrality of the nationalist theme in the discourse of sovereignty 
(Bakk and Szász 2010: 25; Mihăilescu 2005: 30; Tănăsoiu 2005: 125). While it 
can be accepted that the post-1989 Romania has not developed a policy aiming 
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explicitly to annihilate ethnic minorities, important aspects in the general public 
discourse has fuelled inter-ethnic hatred (Csergo 2007: 59, 64; Weber 1998: 147). 
Within this context, the Hungarian minority was among the first to claim rights, 
especially concerning all-level education and separate schools in the mother 
tongue. This led in turn to raising suspicion among Romanians vis-à-vis 
Hungarians loyalty to the post-communist state. The relations between the two 
ethnic groups turned violent in the city of Târgu-Mureş in March 1990 and this 
increased the level of mutual distrust (Gallagher 1995: 88; Tănăsoiu 2005: 125). 
The 1991 Constitution contributed then decisively to this atmosphere by 
securitising, yet again, the post-communist state’s sovereignty through an 
ethno-national discourse. 
Article 1 in the fundamental law (Romanian Parliament 1991) proclaims 
Romania a ‘sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible National State’, thus 
setting the legal framework for the conflation of ethnicity and citizenship 
(Troie 2004: 42). This marked a regrettable return to the ethno-logic behind 
the pre-communist Constitutions of 1866 and 1923 analysed above. When 
corroborated with Article 4(1) founding the state on the ‘unity of the Romanian 
people’, the ethnicisation effect of this charter is evident, which became a matter of 
serious concern to the Hungarians fearing assimilation (Weber 1998: 149). 
Also, while Article 6 recognises and guarantees the preservation of the cultural, 
religious, linguistic and ethnic identity of minorities, Article 13 indicates 
Romanian as the sole official language of the state (Romanian Parliament 1991). 
And it was against this particular provision that the Hungarian political 
representatives have constantly raised the strongest objections. 
Indeed, such provisions and others analysed below asserted abusively the 
objective presence of the nation as condition of political life in defiance of 
Romania’s multicultural (f)actual life. All post-1989 census data indicate the 
clear numeric superiority of the Romanians over the Hungarians, Roma and 
other ethnic groups, but at the same time they show clearly that Romanians are 
not alone in the country. The 1991 Constitution also contains the term ‘national 
minorities’, used previously only in 1952 and implying their subordination to 
the ethnic majority. This subordination is also implied in Article 12 where the 
1st of December is declared the National Day. The provision sanctions constitutionally 
the ‘happiest day’ of the Romanian nation in 1918, defying arrogantly its being 
considered the most painful in Hungarian history, as the day when Transylvania 
and other provinces formed Greater Romania (Troie 2004: 42).  
This lack of respect toward the Hungarian minority was also confirmed in 
a 1992 opinion issued by some of the drafters of the constitution stating that, in 
their understanding, the state was the expression of the human community qua 
national community. More specifically, the concept of nation was considered 
more compatible with the notion of ‘human community’. That was because, 
unlike the notion of ‘society’, a human community ‘expresses precisely the 
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history of those composing the nation, the genetic ties between the successive 
generations and their members’ willingness to live together’ (quoted in Weber 
1998: 150). Such provisions and interpretations, reminding of obsolete racial 
views, encode then legally the actual exclusion from “normal” politics of those 
who do not fit in an ethno-genetic definition of the national community. 
Moreover, this constitutional setting of the post-communist Romanian polity is 
securely fixed in temporality. Article 152(1) indicates in this sense that the 
constitutional provisions regarding ‘the national, independent, unitary and 
indivisible character of the Romanian State [...] and [its] official language shall 
not be subject to revision’ (Romanian Parliament 1991, emphasis added).  
This illustrates, from the perspectives adopted here, the arrogant fixation 
of human life through onomastic-linguistic particularisation in the political time 
of the imagined community. While the 1991 Constitution is applicable 
throughout the territory of Romania, its Article 152 imposes its limitless 
temporal scope, i.e. its foreverness. Given the state’s national character, insisted 
upon throughout the entire constitution, this foreverness means in fact the 
ethnicisation of all imaginable political temporality.  
Having to dwell in this ethnicised time, the Hungarians were the ‘most 
vocal’ opponent of the national definition of the polity and the Democratic Union of 
Hungarians in Romania (DUHR) became the most active promoter of their 
interests in Parliament (Csergo 2007: 58-59; Mihăilescu 2008: 557, 561-562, 575; 
Weber 1998: 149). Following the 1996 elections when Romania saw its first 
truly democratic change in government (Deletant and Siani-Davies 1998: 155; 
Mather 2004: 109), the DUHR entered the coalition government and was to 
remain there, in most subsequent coalitions. Under these conditions, the party 
has traditionally insisted on promoting a political agenda challenging the ethnic 
majority’s discourse of national sovereignty. This has built in turn on the so-
called Cluj Declaration (25 October 1992), which proposed a public focus on 
human rights, equality, decentralisation of administration, and an impartial legal 
system as guarantees for the betterment of minority conditions (Csergo 2002, p. 10; 
Mihăilescu 2008, p. 576).  
Significantly, the Proclamation indicated that, after decades of suffering 
from the lack of rights under Romanian sovereignty, the Hungarian community 
saw such desiderata guaranteed only if the state is reconstituted on the principle of 
inter-ethnic equality. This principle presupposed the internal ‘self-determination’ 
for the Hungarian community as a ‘state-building’ or ‘state-constituting’ nation 
together with the Romanian majority. The logic behind this was that, ‘[t]he Hungarian 
community in Romania constitutes a political subject, it is a state-constituting factor, 
and as such it is an equal partner of the Romanian nation’ (Csergo 2007: 37-38; see 
also Bugajski 2002: 867). This perspective represents to this day the basis of the 
DUHR agenda, with reference to all minorities in the country (UDMR 2008). 
From the methodological perspective employed here, the DUHR discourse has 
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coherently contested for the first time in Romania’s history the ethno-consensus 
of ethno-national sovereignty by destabilising its reliance on the quantitative 
superiority of the ethnic majority. It insists instead that all ethnic communities 
in the country are equally valuable per se and, consequently, equally entitled to 
participate in the constitution of the sovereign consensus. 
Coupled with the exogenous pressures from the conditionality for 
accession to the membership of the European Union (EU), such endogenous 
pressures determined eventually the thawing of inter-ethnic relations in 
Romania after 1993. First, the authorities in Bucharest established the National 
Minorities Council as a consultative body and communication channel with 
legally constituted organisations of national minorities. Also in 1993, the 
DUHR submitted to the Romanian Parliament a draft bill entitled Law on 
National Minorities and Autonomous Communities authored originally by the 
Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania (Bakk and Szász 2010: 25; Weber 
1998: 168). This draft bill proclaimed the inalienable right, equal to that of the 
sovereign majority, to regional autonomy for national minorities defined essentially 
as having a communal life and, therefore, entitled to territorial self-government. 
The DUHR leaders (Borbely 2009) see the respective draft as a ‘comprehensive 
majority-minority contract’ (Csergo 2002: 10).  
However, the context leading to the signing of the Hungary-Romania 
bilateral treaty and the agenda of the two countries’ integration in the EU and 
NATO have postponed a serious debate on that draft bill and the issue of 
autonomy (Atanasova 2004: 413, 418; Csergo 2007: 108; Culic 2006: 186). 
Moreover, the inclusion of the draft bill on the working agenda of the 
Parliament has also been systematically avoided by the Romanian parties up to 
the moment of writing. The EU accession conditionality also failed to address 
deeply rooted reflexes of national sovereignty. Under Union’s eyes, the political 
parties representing the Romanian majority imposed in Parliament the adoption 
of the Local Administration Law 69/1991 and the Education law 84/1995 
producing until the end of the 1990s a (f)actual environment unfriendly to 
ethnic minorities (Csergo 2002: 9-10, 2007: 68; Mihăilescu 2005: 31; Mincu 2009; 
Weber 1998: 157, 160-161). The content of curricula for history teaching in 
particular was humiliating for minority children who had to study the history of 
the country they belonged to as ‘History of Romanians’, i.e. not “of Romania” 
at all instruction levels (Borbely 2009; Murgescu 2001: 280; Weber, 160-161). 
Unfortunately, the EU enlargement did not address specifically these 
shortcomings and the Commission gradually changed its focus during the 
second half of the 1990s toward the socio-economic problems of the Roma 
community. Moreover, the Union also began to generally avoid issues 
concerning collective minority rights (Toggenburg 2005: 733) and preferred 
instead to contribute only ‘to the creation of domestic political space for 
minority participation’ (Sasse 2009: 27). Following the inclusion of the DUHR 
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in the 1996-2000 government coalition, amendments to the laws on public local 
government and education demanded by DUHR and the EU were eventually 
promoted in May 1997 through emergency ordinances, followed later by 
adoption in Parliament (Csergo 2002: 23; Weber 1998: 166).  
Article 23(6) in the ordinance on local administration, adopted as Public 
Administration Law No. 212 by parliament in 2001, allowed for the use of 
minority languages in public administration ‘where a national minority 
represents over 20 per cent of the population’. Articles 55(3) and 58(2, 4) 
stipulated that persons belonging to ethnic minorities could be employed in 
local administration in such areas (Weber 1998: 167-168). The emergency 
ordinance on education, adopted eventually by the Parliament in 1999, 
stipulated guarantees for the education in the minority languages in public 
schools from primary to graduate levels. Following mediation between political 
parties from the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, van der 
Stoel, departments and programmes in both Hungarian and German languages 
were established at the Babeş-Bolyai University. However, resistance on behalf 
of central authorities to fundamental change in this sense remains evident and 
there are no international norms guiding Romania for the implementation of a 
minority friendly education policy (ibid.: 158).  
Successive Romanian governments that included the DUHR were in this 
context more preoccupied to create a positive international image essential for 
the country’s perspectives of Euro-Atlantic integration, while the stance of the 
DUHR concerning the political status of the Hungarian minority became less 
and less disturbing in Bucharest (Csergo 2007: 85). Therefore, the Romanian 
performance concerning the minority conditionality was characterised as 
‘increasingly “accommodating diversity”, although not without continued 
difficulty, substantial debate, and certain limits’ (Ram 2009: 182). 
In 2003, under pressure from the European Commission expressed in the 
Regular Reports, amendments to the 1991 Constitution were adopted with 
unanimity by the Parliament. They improved the quality of the judiciary and 
also granted the use of minority languages in the justice system and local public 
administration (Csergo 2007: 91-92). This was followed by a period of relative 
public silence concerning ethnic minority rights. Only 7 years later, in the 
beginning of 2011, the DUHR could celebrate the adoption in Parliament and the 
ratification by the President of a new education law, which has finally allowed 
teaching in Hungarian, including for ‘Romanian’ history and geography courses.  
However, the draft law on the statute of national minorities proposed by 
DUHR ever since mid-1990s has remained only registered as item 502/ 
26.10.2005 for debate in the Chamber of Deputies, but no further progress has 
been made up to date. Among the reasons for the blocking in Parliament is 
Article 2 in the draft stating that communities, not individuals, constitute the 
state, a description understood as unconstitutional by political parties representing 
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the Romanian majority. Overall, the Romanian authorities have preferred to 
insist on granting individual political rights, while actually continuing to predicate 
the human domain as belonging to one, sovereign national community. The 
Hungarian minority has insisted in response on its right to territorial autonomy. 
This has been a general tendency among historical minorities in Eastern Europe 
(Kymlicka 2007: 385), which see minority rights as mere ‘cover for the 
supremacy by the dominant national group’ (Atanasova 2004: 357).  
It can be asserted consequently that even the conditionality for accession 
to the “supranational” EU could not undo Romania’s ethno-sovereign self and 
its ‘propensity toward nationalism’ (Tănăsoiu 2008: 81). When the DUHR proposed 
that the source of Romanian sovereignty be reformulated with the 2003 
amendments to the Constitution as deriving from the ‘citizens of Romania’ 
instead of the ‘Romanian people’, the political parties of the ethnic majority 
repeatedly rejected the proposal (Csergo 2007: 93; Gallagher 2008: 258-259). 
And once the membership in the Union ceased to be an incentive after 2007, 
there is nothing in view that could determine the desecuritisation of Romania’s 
sovereign ethno-subjectivity.  
Lack of finance, coherent strategies and alternative sources of imagination 
make change superficial especially in the post-communist Romanian educational 
system (Mincu 2009: 71-72). A profound alteration of traditional autochthonist 
views is thus to take generations from now on. Until then, children from the 
Hungarian minority may continue to hear pedagogues teaching, for instance, 
that their forefathers accepted with difficulty the Union of 1918 despite the 
‘generous’ policies of interwar Greater Romania (Murgescu 2001: 284-285). A 
de-ethnicisation of sovereignty in this country remains therefore a project yet to 
be initiated. This research has theorised and evidenced the national sovereignty 
as being apt to engineer its domain through the securitisation of ethnicity, which 
makes multicultural politics of inter-ethnic equality virtually impossible.  
Altering the mechanisms behind such engineering would have to 
somehow build on this theorisation and address the central role of intellectual 
productions in this context. Intellectual elites are eventually responsible for 
producing in public discourse the limits to popular imagination regarding 
possibilities of political life. And the right path toward expanding those 
possibilities may be found by merely following in the footsteps of Heidegger. 
He warned about the oppression of language over Being whose authenticity we 
could regain by refraining from too much use of language and by learning to 
live as much as possible in the nameless (1993: 221-223). In the end, avoiding 
the sophisticated engineering of political time under national onomastics may 
call for the consistent avoidance of onomastics altogether and for a language 
constitutional law constituting anew political spaces as neutral as possible vis-à-
vis cultural identity. 
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